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Corruption on Trial :
Money, Power, and Punishment in  France’s
Chambre de Justice of 17161
Erik Goldner2
Cet article réexamine le Lit de Justice de 1716-1717, dernier  d’une série 
de tribunaux épisodiques et temporaires quoique puissants, instituées dans 
la France de  l’époque moderne pour sanctionner les fraudes aux finances 
royales.  Jusqu’ici, les spécialistes ont sous-estimé le caractère judiciaire des 
Lits de Justice, les  considérant plutôt  comme le masque  d’une expropriation 
des financiers du Roi et la substitution de nouveaux réseaux clientélaires à de 
plus anciens. Le présent article suggère que si cette interprétation possède 
une certaine validité pour les cas précédents, elle ne  s’applique pas en 1716-
17. En se fondant sur  l’analyse du rôle de cette cour,  l’auteur estime que ce 
dernier Lit de Justice  s’est  conformé aux normes judiciaires alors en vigueur 
en punissant un grand nombre de malfaiteurs. Il  conclut en dépeignant les 
limitations plus générales et structurelles qui entravaient les efforts de la 
monarchie française de  l’époque pour résoudre les problèmes posés par la 
corruption et la crise fiscale.  
This article reappraises the Chamber of Justice of 1716–1717, the last in a 
series of periodic, temporary, but powerful tribunals instituted in early modern 
France to punish wrongdoing in the  king’s finances. Until now, scholars have 
undervalued the judicial integrity of Chambers of Justice, interpreting them 
as fronts for expropriating royal financiers and replacing old client networks 
with new ones. This article suggests that, while this interpretation may to 
some extent be valid for previous Chambers of Justice, it does not hold for the 
tribunal of 1716–1717. Analyzing data  compiled from the  court’s docket, this 
article argues that the last Chamber adhered to  contemporary judicial norms, 
punishing a wide range of malefactors. It  concludes by sketching out broader, 
structural limits to the early modern French  monarchy’s efforts to address 
fiscal crisis and corruption.
1 This article was written with the support of a fellowship from the Georges Lurcy Charitable and 
Educational Trust, and a grant from the Mrs. Giles Whiting Foundation enabled much of the research 
and writing of the present work. A grant from the Faculty Summer Research Support Competition of 
the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences at California State University, Northridge made ad-
ditional research possible. A version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the Society 
for the Study of French History in July 2006 at the University of Sussex. The author thanks Peter 
Campbell, John Hardman, Thomas Kaiser, Guy Rowlands, and David K. Smith for their  comments at 
that forum. The author also thanks Jeffrey Auerbach, Pierre Force, Martha Howell, Matt Jones, Carl 
Wennerlind, Isser Woloch, and the two anonymous reviewers of the present journal for their advice. 
2 Erik Goldner is Assistant Professor of History at California State University, Northridge, 18111 
 Nordhoff Street, Northridge, CA 91330. He may be reached at erik.goldner@csun.edu. He is cur-
rently working on a book on the politics and  culture of corruption in the reign of Louis XIV entitled 
The Shadow of the Sun King.
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Daniel François Voysin, the chancellor of France, descended from his carriage in front of the Grands Augustins in Paris on a March morning in 1716. A 
delegation of judges chosen from the  kingdom’s most powerful courts welcomed him 
on the  day’s occasion : the inauguration of a new Chambre de Justice, a temporary but 
powerful tribunal  commissioned to punish wrongdoing in the  king’s finances. The 
judges of the Chamber of Justice escorted him to the  monastery’s great hall where 
the court would hold its sessions. “The disorder in the  king’s finances”, Voysin told 
them in his opening address, “is the unfortunate but nearly inevitable  consequence of 
war. And nothing is more advantageous once peace has been restored than to reform 
abuses and correct wrongdoing. (…) It is for the investigation of these disorders 
(…) that you have been  commissioned”. He encouraged the judges by  concluding, 
“You will restore abundance to the realm, by making certain men return to the  king’s 
coffers the  considerable sums by which they unjustly profited”3. The magistrates 
listened, but few could imagine the difficulties ahead. Nor could they foresee that 
this Chamber of Justice would be the last of its kind4.
France had a long tradition of such tribunals, and together they formed an 
institution that had few if any analogues elsewhere in early modern Europe5. As far 
back as the early fourteenth century, the French monarchy had established special 
courts to prosecute those accused of mishandling its monies6. Before the sixteenth 
century, they invariably targeted individuals, particularly finance ministers whom 
the king wished to eliminate7. But beginning in the 1520s, new courts were given 
extraordinary powers to investigate not just a few but indeed all of the  crown’s 
financiers – the term  contemporaries used for those in France who collected, 
channeled, and disbursed royal funds8. At least eight such  comprehensive tribunals 
occurred during the sixteenth century, and five more followed in the next century9. 
The seventeenth-century courts tended to last between six months and two years, 
with the exception of the Chamber of Justice of 1661-1665, which stands out not 
only for its length but also its rigor. In terms of the sentences it handed down – most 
notably against the disgraced finance minister Nicolas Fouquet – and the fines that 
were drafted in  connection with it, it was more punitive than any other extraordinary 
tribunal in France before the Revolution10.
 3 Bibliothèque nationale de France (hereafter BN), manuscrits français (hereafter MF) 7586, 
fols. 1r-3r.
 4 On the Chamber of Justice of 1716-1717, see Dessert (1984, pp. 238-276) ; Goldner (2008) ; Ravel 
(1928) ; Villain (1988).
 5 The best introduction to the Chamber as an institution remains Bosher (1973). For Chambers of 
Justice before 1716, see especially Bayard (1974, 1988, pp. 311-334) ; Dessert (1974, 1984).
 6 Dessert (1984, pp. 238-239).
 7 Bosher (1970, p. 4).
 8 For French financiers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see, besides the works of Bayard, 
Bosher, and Dessert noted above, Chaussinand-Nogaret (1993) ; Dessert (1979) ; Durand (1996).
 9 The state of the evidence from the sixteenth century makes it impossible to defi nitively list the in-
vestigations held in that period, but inquiries certainly took place in 1523, 1524, 1527-1536, 1561-
1562, 1581, 1583-1584, 1584-1587, 1596, 1601-1602, 1605-1607, 1607, 1624-1625, and 1661-1669, 
though the latter effectively ceased operation in 1665. Bayard (1974, pp. 139-140) ; Bosher (1970, 
p. 17, 1973, pp. 20-21) ; Dessert (1984, p. 239).
10 Dessert (1984, pp. 240, 259, 262 & 272).
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Scholars have long recognized that the lack of meaningful day-to-day oversight 
created ample opportunities for misconduct in early modern French royal finance11. 
The crown instituted Chambers of Justice from time to time in part because its 
ordinary means for ensuring the probity of financiers was so inadequate. Normally, 
one of more than a half-dozen Chambers of Accounts verified the books of most 
fiscal office-holders,  contractors, and farmers12. For a variety of reasons, including 
delays in collection or expenditure, the accounts of financiers often reached those 
courts after a  considerable lag, sometimes of ten years or more13. In times of crisis, 
the monarchy allowed  contractors to forgo accounting to those courts altogether. It 
instead permitted them, as a favor or an encouragement to participate in a traité or 
fiscal  contract, to present their accounts directly to the Royal Council, where they 
could expect less rigorous examination14.
Given the weakness of ordinary oversight in royal finance and the long line of 
spectacular but temporary tribunals that preceded the latest Chamber of Justice, 
observers in 1716 would have been justified in expecting the new court to play 
out along familiar lines. A few prominent financiers would be  condemned, many 
inconsequential ones would also be punished, the crown would reap large fines from 
others, and the hostility that the  king’s subjects harbored against all of them would 
be soothed, at least for a time.
But the  context that gave rise to the new Chamber helped to make it different from 
its predecessors. After more than two draining decades of war, the French monarchy 
 confronted what was arguably the worst fiscal crisis in its history – worse even 
than the one that helped to trigger a revolution seventy years later15. The pressure 
on officials to use the tribunal as a means to extract wealth from royal agents was 
thus especially intense. Politics also played a role in shaping the new Chamber. Its 
most recent antecedent had taken place under a young and headstrong Louis XIV 
intent on asserting his authority over the  kingdom’s financial networks. But the latest 
Chamber occurred during a regency. Such regimes were notorious for the political 
uncertainties that tended to accompany them16. And the government of the new 
regent, Philippe II, duc  d’Orléans, was indeed fraught with uncertainty. Louis  XIV’s 
will and dynastic rules gave Orléans the reins of government. But Louis before his 
death, and many at court before and after the  king’s demise, distrusted him. Added to 
this was the restiveness of the  kingdom’s most powerful institutions, particularly its 
high courts, after decades of heavy-handed rule under the Sun King. Thus Orléans, 
as he launched a Chamber of Justice six months into his regency, faced a more 
precarious outlook than Louis XIV had a half-century earlier17.
11 Bosher (1970, pp. 4 & 19-20) ; Dessert (1984, pp. 287 & 292).
12 Bosher (1970, pp. 111-122) ; Pernot (1979).
13 Bosher (1970, p. 120).
14 Villain (1988, pp. 545-546).
15 The total royal debt in 1715, which may have been as high as 3.5 billion livres, was in real terms 
as large as that of the late 1780s, but it was borne by a poorer, less populous kingdom. Félix (1994, 
p. 603) ; Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, Rosenthal (2000, pp. 69-71).
16 For the distinctive political issues involved in early modern French regencies, see Crawford (2004).
17 For more on the challenges Orléans  confronted at the beginning of his regency, see Dupilet (2011, 
pp. 79-122) ; Shennan (1979, pp. 9-32).
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Once the new tribunal was underway, more differences between it and 
its predecessors emerged. The Chamber of the 1660s had been marked by its 
punitiveness ; this one was characterized, among other things, by its scope. The 
Chamber of Justice of 1716-1717 sentenced dozens of financiers for crimes ranging 
from embezzlement to extortion. More than four thousand other agents faced special 
royal fines based on the personal financial declarations they had been forced to 
submit – a requirement without precedent in previous Chambers. This was in effect 
one of the broadest, most searching inquiries in the history of the French monarchy, 
if not one of the largest single investigations ever  conducted in pre-modern Europe. 
It was also short-lived. After operating for only one year, with hundreds of cases still 
on its docket, the Chamber of Justice was abruptly closed by royal order.
The present article examines what this episode – as turbulent as it was brief 
– reveals about justice, money, and power in early-eighteenth century France. My 
argument begins with a seemingly simple premise : the Chamber was an authoritative 
forum for the dispensing of justice. It was, in other words, a court of law. Historians 
have tended to obscure or dismiss this fact. They have long  conflated the  Chamber’s 
fiscal and political aims with its judicial mission, muddling the intentions of the kings 
and ministers who instituted and watched over Chambers of Justice with those of the 
judges who actually operated them. Scholars of course acknowledge the Chamber 
as a tribunal. But that, they suggest, was merely a façade. The court was in effect 
a front for the expropriation of those who handled the  king’s money. John Bosher, 
for example, has described it as “a royal business institution disguised as a court of 
law”, best understood as “one of the financial organs of the monarchy”18. Scholars 
moreover tend to portray the Chamber less as a court than a mechanism to flush out 
unwanted networks of financiers. In the  Chamber’s wake, one financial clan – in 
the picturesque phrasing of Françoise Bayard and Daniel Dessert, one “mafia” or 
“racket” – invariably took the place of another19.
When historians do pause to  consider the  Chamber’s actual work as a court, 
they invariably  condemn its methods and procedures as unjust. Earlier generations 
of scholars indeed became apoplectic on the subject. The judges who staffed the 
“odious” court, according to the normally sober Marcel Marion, were biased 
against financiers and indeed “ condemned [them] in advance”20. The  court’s judicial 
procedure, in the words of another scholar, was “arbitrary”21. According to one 
overwrought nineteenth-century account, the Chamber was a “fiscal investigation 
with all the horror of a Catholic inquisition”, armed with “a neighboring room stocked 
with instruments of torture”22. Such charges  continued to appear in respectable 
surveys almost a century later, and they still surface in popular accounts today23.
Historians in recent decades have toned down their criticism of the  court’s work, 
but only somewhat. No less an authority than Daniel Dessert persists in viewing the 
Chamber less as a forum for dispensing justice than as a “repressive apparatus”24. 
18 Bosher (1973, p. 31).
19 Bosher (1973, pp. 31-32) ; Bayard (1974, pp. 134-135) ; Dessert (1974, pp. 868-869).
20 Marion (1914, pp. 73-74).
21 Richou (1905, p. 97). 
22 Lémontey (1832, p. 65).
23 Carré (1909, p. 12) ; Gleeson (1999, pp. 111-112).
24 Dessert (1984, p. 242).
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In  Bosher’s words, the tribunals were “usually more interested in recovering money 
or removing an embarrassing creditor than in meting out justice”25. The greatest and 
most powerful wrongdoers inevitably escaped punishment, the standard accounts 
agree ; the lowliest fiscal agents bore the brunt of the  Chamber’s penalties26. Bayard 
summarizes the scholarly view with the quip, “Chambers of Justice were not 
Chambers that were just”27.
Among other aims, this article deflates the long-running narrative of the 
 Chamber’s injustice. The interpretations sketched above may or may not be valid for 
earlier versions of the Chamber, but they certainly fail to account for the tribunal of 
1716-1717. I argue, first of all, that that Chamber was indeed just – as just, at least, as 
any court could have been in the period. Its judges used their powers with precision 
and care, adhering to  contemporary norms. Second, I present and analyze data from 
the  court’s docket to suggest how wide-ranging and serious its prosecutions were. 
A broad spectrum of royal agents, as well as a wide variety of crimes, fell under the 
 Chamber’s scrutiny. Third and finally, I indicate deeper structural limits to the early 
modern French  monarchy’s efforts to address fiscal crisis and corruption. Those 
limits did not lie in the supposed viciousness of the Chamber. Rather, they lay in the 
intersection of justice, money, and power in the period.
THE CHAMBER AT WORK
In the spring of 1716, royal decrees engineered by the de facto minister of royal 
finance, Adrien Maurice, duc de Noailles, endowed the newest Chamber of Justice 
with expansive powers28. These included the right to demand and review personal 
financial statements from almost all the  kingdom’s fiscal agents, their families, and 
their associates – as noted above, an unprecedented intrusion into the murky world 
of royal finance29. They also included the more customary dispensation to review 
the accounts of all fiscal  contractors, whose activities in preceding decades had 
generated intense popular hostility. And in its criminal cases, the Chamber was given 
the power to punish abuses throughout the kingdom without appeal, “sovereignly 
and in the last resort”. It was authorized to hand down the strongest penalties, up to 
and including death30.
But how in fact did the  Chamber’s judges use the powers their Regency backers 
gave them ? Evidence reveals that, far from pillaging financiers, the magistrates 
investigated and punished them according to carefully formulated standards that 
 contemporaries  considered just. This was hardly a foregone  conclusion, given that 
Regency officials had handpicked the new members of the Chamber for reasons other 
25 Bosher (1970, p. 18).
26 Bayard (1974, pp. 129-130) ; Bosher (1973, pp. 27-28) ; Dessert (1984, p. 251) ; Marion (1914, p. 74).
27 Bayard (1974, p. 132).
28 See the establishing royal edict of March 1716 in BN, Collection Clairambault (hereafter CL) 767, 
fols. 84-90 ; the royal declaration of 17 March 1716 in BN, CL 767, fols. 103r-113r ; and the declara-
tion of 1 April 1716 in BN, CL 767, fols. 128-131.
29 BN, CL 767, fols. 106r-109r. The submission of fi nancial declarations for the purpose of royal taxa-
tion was not altogether novel in this period. Bonney (1993, pp. 392-396 & 400-405). But it was cer-
tainly a break from past practice as far as Chambers of Justice were  concerned. BN, MF 7769, p. 253.
30 BN, CL 767, fols. 88v & 87r.
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than their ability to dispense justice. For the  Chamber’s lead prosecutor, Noailles 
proposed Charles Michel Bouvard de Fourqueux. For the  chief judge, he tapped 
Chrétien II de Lamoignon, marquis de Basville. They were first and foremost men 
Noailles thought he could trust. Fourqueux, before his nomination to be procureur 
général or prosecutor general of the Chamber of Justice, had held the equivalent 
honor in  Paris’s Chamber of Accounts. The brother-in-law of a prominent member of 
the  Regency’s Council of Finance, Fourqueux was reputedly intelligent and pliable 
– both attractive traits for Noailles. The proposed président or  chief judge of the 
Chamber, Lamoignon, was chosen because he was the senior président à mortier in 
the Parlement of Paris, the most eminent tribunal in the kingdom and a body that the 
Regency at this point was eager to please. Unlike other senior magistrates from that 
court, he reportedly had few personal  connections to financiers31. He had moreover 
the advantage of a distinguished name, one linked to the previous Chamber of the 
1660s, over which his grandfather had briefly presided32.
The journal of one Héracle-Michel Fréteau sheds especially useful light on how 
the  Chamber’s members were selected and how the court functioned thereafter. 
Since the present article draws important evidence from this source, it is necessary 
to pause and  consider it here. A seasoned avocat in the Parlement of Paris, Fréteau 
was  commissioned in 1716 to dispatch orders from the Chamber to the Council of 
Finance headed by Noailles. He was thus well-positioned to observe the interactions 
of the  tribunal’s members and regency officials. He purportedly took daily notes on 
what he saw while the Chamber was in session, later adding to his log a  compendium 
of relevant royal ordinances, as well as a series of essays on the  tribunal’s creation 
and demise33. Overall,  Fréteau’s journal is the only extended eyewitness account of 
the court that we possess. Indeed, no other source from this or any other Chamber 
of Justice can match its depth of insight. It has, of course, its share of bias. It tends 
in particular to praise Fourqueux while criticizing Noailles and Lamoignon34. 
Nonetheless all three of those men – who eventually quarreled over the court – 
ordered their clerks to transcribe  Fréteau’s journal for their personal libraries35. Thus 
even these antagonists seemingly agreed on the value of his account. While it must 
be read with care, it remains an essential source.
31 BN, nouvelles acquisitions françaises (hereafter NAF) 8442, pp. 11-12.
32 BN, NAF 8442, p. 20.
33 Bibliothèque de  l’Arsenal (hereafter BA), MS 2650, especially the avertissement. After the  Chamber’s 
demise, Fréteau (1663-1751/2)  continued to pursue a distinguished legal and administrative career. 
An avocat in the Parlement of Paris from 1682, he served in the Chancellerie from 1723 to 1741, and 
he was for some time Chancellor  d’Aguesseau’s  chief secretary. At the time of his death, he held the 
honor of doyen of the ordre des avocats. Boislisle (1881, p. 94) ; Martin (1887, p. 61).
34 For his praise of Fourqueux, see for instance BN, NAF 8442, pp. 11, 28-29 & 43. For his criticisms 
of Lamoignon, see for example BA MS 2650, pp. 6-7 (second series) ; BN, NAF 8442, pp. 12 & 
20-21.
35  Fréteau’s journal currently exists in five versions held in four Parisian archives. The original is BA, 
MS 2650. In the present article, due to the varying accessibility and legibility of the versions, I have 
tended to use  Lamoignon’s copy (BN, NAF 8442) or  Fourqueux’s copy (Bibliothèque Mazarine 
(hereafter BM), MS 2347). The principal difference between the original and its copies lies in the 
diverse ways in which the latter are organized. For a more detailed discussion of the journal and its 
copies, see Goldner (2008, pp. 551-555).
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Once the  Chamber’s leaders had been chosen, a  committee led by Noailles turned 
to  compiling a list of judges to staff it36. Though previous Chambers had included 
magistrates from the provinces, this one was limited to those from jurisdictions 
based in Paris37. Expediency was the reason Noailles gave. Because he wanted the 
Chamber to act quickly in order to minimize disruption to royal finances, he claimed 
he wanted to avoid making provincial judges “incur the expense of travel and then 
send them back almost as soon as they arrived”38. He may also have calculated that 
an all-Parisian Chamber would be easier to  control than one including provincials 
who were less  connected to Orléans and the new regime.
Noailles and his  committee selected for the  Chamber’s bench their friends, 
acquaintances, and more generally those they  considered respectable39. Thirty judges 
in all were named, about the same as the number chosen for the previous Chamber of 
the 1660s40. Some of the new  Chamber’s magistrates were selected for their personal 
 connections. Others were chosen for broader political reasons, first and foremost 
because they hailed from important jurisdictions whose support was crucial to the 
 Chamber’s success41. Most of all, Noailles and his group chose men on whom they 
thought they could rely, or who at least would not cause trouble.
The  Chamber’s magistrates then settled into the new extraordinary tribunal. 
Even though it was temporary, it looked much like its permanent counterparts. In 
the morning, the judges gathered in the Grands Augustins – its great hall having 
been redecorated with judicial benches covered, as in the Parlement, with fleur-de-
lis tapestries – to take depositions, hear cases, and issue rulings. In the afternoons, 
hearings ceased as the magistrates worked in small groups to audit accounts and 
prepare criminal cases. In addition to the thirty judges and the lead prosecutor, the 
 Chamber’s  commissioned personnel included roughly forty deputies, clerks, and 
bailiffs. There were also some eighty  commis or assistants who audited royal agents, 
as well as a specially-uniformed troop of archers who enforced court orders. All in all, 
the Chamber hummed with the activity of more than one hundred fifty people. And 
this does not include the dozens of deputy judges and prosecutors in the provinces 
who spearheaded the  tribunal’s work outside Paris42. Seen from this vantage point, 
the Chamber appears less like a façade for expropriation and cronyism, as scholars 
have long framed it, and more like how  contemporaries must have perceived it – as 
one of the largest single investigations that France or indeed Europe had yet seen.
The Chamber looked like a typical high court of the period, and in order to fulfill 
its mission, it needed to work like one as well. In its criminal cases, the court by 
royal mandate adhered to standard  contemporary procedure, that of the Ordinance 
36 BM, MS 2347, endnote 1, pp. 7-8 ; and BN, NAF 8442, p. 13.
37 Nearly one-third of the members of the two previous Chambers of 1624-1625 and 1661-1665 had 
been selected from provincial courts. A useful chart of the judicial  composition of these and other 
Chambers can be found in Bosher (1973, pp. 20-21).
38 BN, MF 7769, p. 30. 
39 BN, NAF 8442, p. 13.
40 Twelve men were selected from the Parlement of Paris and eight from the Chamber of Accounts. 
They were joined by six maîtres des requêtes and four judges from the Court of Aids. For the names 
of the  Chamber’s judges and the courts from which they came, see the printed royal  commission in 
BN, CL 767, fols. 95-98.
41 BN, NAF 8442, pp. 19-25.
42 BN, NAF 8442, pp. 79-84 ; BM, MS 2347, endnote 6, p. 29 ; Cheype (1975, p. 94).
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of 1670, Louis  XIV’s landmark criminal code43. One example of a Chamber criminal 
case must suffice here in order to illustrate how this three-stage procedure worked in 
practice44. The case involved one Jean-François Gruet, a Châtelet agent and police 
inspector. His superior –  Paris’s formidable lieutenant general of police, Marc René 
de Voyer de Paulmy, marquis  d’Argenson – had  commissioned Gruet years earlier to 
collect tax arrears from the  city’s corporations of artisans and merchants45. After the 
Chamber opened, ordinary Parisians thronged the  prosecutor’s office to denounce 
him.
So began the first stage of the proceedings against Gruet. As part of what was 
called the instruction préparatoire, Fourqueux, due to the  complaints he had received, 
asked the court to open an investigation in early June 1716. In his request he alleged 
that Gruet had amassed a “quick and stunning fortune” through the “malversations, 
 concussions, et abus”  committed in his tax collection and that he had exercised 
an “outrageous tyranny” over those who owed money, persecuting especially the 
poorest among them46. As procedure dictated, the Chamber then appointed one 
of its judges – in this case François Le Fèvre de La Malmaison, a  conseiller in 
the Parlement of Paris before his Chamber  commission and a magistrate whom 
Fréteau describes as “hard working, but difficult and demanding” – to  conduct the 
information47. Malmaison proceeded to collect additional facts and hear witnesses 
according to strict rules.
The case then moved into its second phase, the instruction définitive. Malmaison, 
now aided by his fellow Chamber judge Jean-Baptiste-Nicolas-Antoine Nicolay, 
interrogated Gruet,  confirmed the testimonies of witnesses, and  confronted the 
defendant with those witnesses. In the end, over eighty people came forward to 
depose against Gruet. The immensity of the task before Malmaison, Nicolay, and 
their staff prolonged the inquiry over the span of more than five months48.
In late November 1716, the case entered its final phase of review and judgment. 
The report by Malmaison and Nicolay was now read aloud before the full Chamber 
– a dossier so lengthy that ten days were needed to present it49. Almost a dozen 
charges were leveled against Gruet, including hoarding  confiscated property in 
his own house and sometimes even unlawfully imprisoning people there. Most 
importantly, the evidence indicated that – among the roughly eight hundred people 
Gruet had incarcerated both legally and illegally for failing to pay their capitation 
tax – he had demanded improper fees for himself from almost all of them50. After 
hearing  Fourqueux’s sentencing recommendation and  confronting Gruet with the 
case against him, the  Chamber’s judges opined and voted. Six judges, including 
43 For the mandate on criminal procedure, see Article XXVII of the royal declaration of 17 March 1716, 
reprinted in Isambert, Decrusy, Jourdan (1821-1833, 21, pp. 98-99). For the Ordinance of 1670 itself, 
see Isambert, Decrusy, Jourdan (1821-1833, 18, pp. 71-423).
44 This practical example is based in part on general discussions of the criminal procedure of the Ordi-
nance of 1670 in Andrews (1994, pp. 422-435 & 473-479) ; Carbasse (2000, pp. 179-186).
45 BM, MS 2347, p. 432.
46 BN, CL 768, fol.  86.
47 BN, NAF 8442, p. 25.
48 BN, MF 10962, p. 522.
49 BN, MF 10962, pp. 521-522, 526, 528, 530-531, 534, 543-545 & 547.
50 BM, MS 2347, pp. 432-450.
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Lamoignon, favored the  prosecutor’s call for  Gruet’s execution. A majority, however, 
rejected that recommendation and voted instead to send him to the galleys for life51.
The Gruet affair, though unusual in its length and  complexity, was typical in 
its basic procedure. To be sure, these trials, and early modern French criminal 
procedure in general, fail to satisfy certain tenets of modern liberal jurisprudence. 
In this period, for example, there was no judicial presumption of innocence. But 
as Richard Mowery Andrews persuasively argues, these apparent failings did not 
prevent judges of the period from dispensing justice in a strict, rule-bound, and 
rational way52.
This is not to say that all cases or defendants received equal attention from 
the  Chamber’s judges. The most notorious wrongdoers tended to get the greatest 
scrutiny, and ‘making examples’ of them became a mantra for the tribunal. In the first 
death sentence it rendered, against a financier who was shown to have embezzled 
more than 1.5 million livres, the court intended, according to Fréteau, to make “a 
full example of him before the public”53. The Chamber instructed its deputy judges 
and prosecutors in the provinces to imitate its approach. Fourqueux, for instance, 
ordered his provincial deputies to “focus principally on the punishment of great 
crimes in order to procure examples”54. The  Chamber’s justice, far from seeking the 
general ruin of financiers, aimed at making, as Fréteau puts it, “a few examples of 
severity”55.
A review of court documents reveals just how diligently the Chamber tried 
to mete out that exemplary justice. Rather than believing all the denunciations it 
received, the  Chamber’s members were attuned to denouncers’ ulterior motives56. Its 
punishments moreover were sometimes lighter than they could have been under the 
law. Though royal decrees mandated capital punishment for the worst fiscal offenses, 
the court sentenced only three men to death, two of whom ultimately managed to 
avoid that fate57.
Many financiers were punished mildly or not at all. The  Chamber’s leniency 
indeed began to worry the  court’s architect, the duc de Noailles. He reportedly urged 
the  Chamber’s judges to display more “cruelty” in order to “intimidate” financiers58. 
When the military provisioner Antoine Dubout was sentenced in May 1716 for 
selling rotten meat to soldiers, Noailles wrote to Lamoignon that he was “astonished 
by the decision (…), that such a rogue, who has killed thousands of soldiers in the 
hospitals and armies of the king, was let off with nine years of exile and a fine of fifty 
thousand livres”. He  continued, “If the Chamber persists in having as much leniency 
51 BM, MS 2347, pp. 454-457 ; BN, MF 10962, pp. 553-557.
52 Andrews (1994, pp. 420-421 & 428).
53 The case  concerned Claude François Paparel, a trésorier de  l’ordinaire des guerres or military finan-
cial officer. BM, MS 2347, endnote 7, p. 33 ; BA, MS 2650, fol. 4r.
54 Charles Michel Bouvard de Fourqueux, procureur général (prosecutor general) of the Chamber of 
Justice, to his substituts (provincial deputy prosecutors), October 1716, BM, MS 2348, no.108 (first 
series), pp. 2-3.
55 BN, NAF 8442, p. 42.
56 Fourqueux to the  Chamber’s subdélégués, 30 June 1716, BN, CL 767, fols. 204v-205r.
57 The three men whom the Chamber sentenced to death were Claude François Paparel, Henri Chartier, 
and Jean Penot. The first was pardoned by Orléans. The second escaped his sentence on a technical-
ity. For the third, see BM, MS 2347, pp. 387-391.
58 BN, NAF 8442, pp. 66-67.
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with criminals of this sort, then one can hardly hope to make examples of them to 
prevent these kinds of misconduct in the future”59.
An investigation of a  contemporary summary of the  Chamber’s  completed cases, 
cross-referenced with related sources, reveals an overall picture of the punishments 
handed down by the tribunal60. Over the course of one year beginning in March 
1716, the Chamber of Justice brought forty-three cases to  completion. These 
cases involved at least eighty-nine defendants61. Table 1 categorizes the sentences 
according to the severity of punishment62.
Table 1. Sentences handed down by the Chamber of Justice,
March 1716–March 1717




Pending further inquiry 8 9
Acquitted 26 29
Received amnesty 1 1
Unknown 2 2
Sources : BN, MF 10962-10963 ; BN, NAF 8443-8446 ; and BM, MS 2347.
To be sure, some defendants suffered severe penalties for their crimes. A huissier 
des tailles named Liger Seigne, for instance, was sentenced to the ritual shaming 
of an amende honorable, the seizure of his assets, and a life sentence in the  king’s 
galleys for the extortion, fraud, and violence he was shown to have  committed in 
59 Adrien Maurice, duc de Noailles to Chrétien II de Lamoignon, marquis de Basville, premier prési-
dent ( chief judge) of the Chamber of Justice, 29 May 1716. BN, MF 6935, fol. 45v.
60 For the summary list of  completed cases, see BN, NAF 8446, fols. 16v-19r.
61 The actual number of sentenced defendants remains unclear, because at least one case involved a 
group only identified collectively – the officiers jurés of the corporation of  Paris’s porteurs de grain. 
BN, NAF 8444, fols. 31v-33v. For purposes of analysis, I am excluding from the tables below a 
group of military provisioners called étapiers from Metz, who – unlike the other defendants – came 
before the Chamber because they had turned themselves in. As prescribed by royal edict, they were 
eligible to receive an amnesty, but the sources are silent about their actual fate. BN, CL 767, fols. 89r ; 
BN, NAF 8446, fol. 44v.
62 A sentence is defined here as ‘heavy’ when it involved a punishment more severe than banishment for 
five years (for instance, sending a defendant to the galleys), and/or a fine of more than 5,000 livres. 
A ‘medium’ sentence involved banishment for less than five years, and/or a fine of less than 5,000 
livres. A ‘light’ sentence refers to being censured (admonêté or blâmé), sometimes accompanied by 
a small fine. ‘Pending further inquiry’ refers to sentences where final judgement was postponed until 
investigators could be plus amplement informé. The defendant who received an amnesty – Victor 
Fournier, an entrepreneur général de la fourniture des armées in Charlesville accused of fraud in 
his arms deliveries to the crown – did so after fleeing and being judged by the Chamber in absentia. 
He returned only after an amnesty was offered by royal declaration in September 1716 to financial 
wrongdoers in return for paying a taxe or special fine. Fournier paid 50,000 livres. BN, NAF 8445, 
fol. 29lr.
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his collection of the taille, the main direct tax63. But as Table 1 shows, defendants 
who received punishments like  Seigne’s were a minority – little more than one-fifth 
of all those judged. What is striking is that a solid majority – almost two-thirds of 
all defendants – received either light punishments, had their sentences postponed 
pending further inquiry, or were acquitted altogether. In fact, almost one out of 
every three defendants was in the latter group alone. Time after time, the Chamber 
dismissed cases due to lack of evidence64. Compared with data  compiled by Richard 
Mowery Andrews on the Parlement of Paris, Chatelêt, and provincial courts later in 
the eighteenth century, the Chamber of Justice far exceeded other jurisdictions in its 
tendency to acquit defendants65. 
Additional light is shed on the  Chamber’s sentencing practices when  Fourqueux’s 
punishment recommendations are  compared with the magistrates’ subsequent 
sentences. For twenty-seven  convicted defendants, evidence exists for both what the 
prosecutor general recommended and what the  Chamber’s judges ultimately handed 
down. In the case of nine of these defendants, the  Chamber’s  condemnations were 
more severe than what Fourqueux had urged. But in the case of eighteen defendants, 
its punishments were milder. Thus in two out of every three cases in which both 
 prosecutor’s recommendations and final sentences are known, the Chamber was 
actually more lenient than what the  king’s attorney had recommended. Historians 
have portrayed the Chamber as ruthless, but the  tribunal’s record tells a different 
story.
DEFENDANTS AND CHARGES
The  Chamber’s sentencing practices suggest that a broader reappraisal is in 
order. This section tests the validity of two  common charges against the court. The 
first can be dispatched relatively quickly. Here the claim is that the tribunal was a 
mechanism to replace one financial clan – one “racket” or “mafia” – with another. 
Scholars like Bayard and Dessert have provided deep insight into the workings of 
clan and clientage in royal finance. Other historians have done the same for the royal 
court, administration, and judiciary66. But in the case of the Chamber of Justice of 
1716-1717, there is little evidence to suggest that clan and clientage were important 
factors. To the  contrary, the sources indicate that they played very little role indeed. 
In this, the tribunal strongly differed from its immediate predecessor, the Chamber 
of 1661-1665, which supplanted Fouquet and his allies with those of Colbert67. 
There is simply no analogue to that in the last Chamber. Though rumors circulated 
that two former  controllers general of finance, Pontchartrain and Desmaretz, would 
63 BN, CL 767, fols. 247-248.
64 For instance, the Chamber found the accusations against the trésorier Pierre Haguelon “calumnious” 
and ordered his release. BN, CL 770, fols. 35-36.
65 In 1736, the earliest year for which data is available, the Parlement of Paris dismissed 21 percent of 
its cases. In that same year, little more than 6 percent of cases were dismissed in provincial courts, 
and none in the Châtelet. Later in the century, the Parlement dismissed cases at an even lower rate. In 
1787, less than 10 percent of cases there were dismissed. Andrews (1994, pp. 482 & 484).
66 The literature is vast, but see in particular Beik (1985) ; Chapman (2004) ; Kettering (1986) ; Ketter-
ing (2002) ; Le Roy Ladurie (2001) ; Mettam (1988).
67 Dessert (1984, pp. 279-310, 1987, pp. 231-262) ; Mongrédien (1956).
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undergo scrutiny by the court, this never came to pass68. Indeed, Orléans, far from 
being intent on  Desmaretz’s destruction in the Chamber, sought his advice on how 
best to end it. If the tribunal targeted anyone in particular, it was Paul Poisson de 
Bourvalais, a long-time fiscal  contractor who was as wealthy as he was notorious, 
and perhaps one or two of his associates – hardly a mafia69.
The second charge is that, as  contemporaries claimed and later scholars have 
assumed, the Chamber passed over the most prominent wrongdoers while punishing 
only the most inconsequential. Here the court indeed appears open to criticism. 
Bourvalais was among the very first to be arrested at the  Chamber’s opening, but 
bickering between the prosecutor and judges derailed the case against this notable 
defendant. Whether guilty or not, Bourvalais’ ultimate release made it appear that 
this infamous financier had avoided punishment70. Other powerful royal money 
handlers – the banker and former traitant Samuel Bernard among them – could be 
added to the list of those who eluded Chamber scrutiny71. So it seems at first glance 
that only insignificant people bore the brunt of the  court’s punishments. The sole 
individual whom the Chamber actually hanged, one Jean Penot, was an obscure 
receveur des tailles whose wealth amounted to a modest fifteen hundred livres72.
But a closer look at whom the Chamber punished reveals that wealthy and 
powerful wrongdoers did indeed suffer punishment. The military treasurer Claude 
François Paparel, though he avoided hanging thanks to a pardon from the regent, 
was certainly no insignificant financier73. Nor was Gruet, who at the time of his 
imprisonment had amassed two hundred thousand livres – a personal fortune that 
was  considerable in itself, and fifteen times greater than what he had possessed a 
decade earlier, when he had begun to moonlight as a fiscal agent under  d’Argenson’s 
 command74. The  Chamber’s principal  convicts,  contrary to the assertions of 
historians like Marion, were not always “people of modest means” or “pitiful” fiscal 
operators75.
Who in fact were the defendants in the Chamber of Justice of 1716-1717, and what 
were they charged with ? Though no occupation predominates, the sources describe 
almost one in six defendants as  commis or préposés – clerks or subcontractors who 
answered to other fiscal agents. This seems to lend validity to the charge that the 
Chamber mainly targeted low-level operators. Table 2 lists the defendants’ most 
 common occupations76.
68 Buvat (1865, pp. 129-130 & 144) ; Dangeau (1854-1860, 17, p. 36).
69 BA, MS 2650, p.15 (second series).
70 Goldner (2008, pp. 155-156).
71 Dessert (1984, pp. 199-201).
72 BM, MS 2347, pp. 387-391.
73 The Chamber-ordered auction of  Paparel’s carriages, paintings, and fi ne wines, as well as a subse-
quent sale of assets at his grand country estate, are indications of his fortune. Buvat (1865, pp. 141-
142 & 163).
74 BM, MS 2347, p. 432.
75 Marion (1914, p. 74).
76 Sources identify a number of these defendants with multiple professions or occupations, so there is 
some degree of overlap in the  table’s categories.
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Table 2. Most  common occupations of defendants sentenced
by the Chamber of Justice, March 1716–March 1717
Occupations Number of defendants 
described as (N=89)
Percentage of total defendants
Commis or préposé 15 17
Étapier (military supplier) 10 11
Taille collector 9 10
Other justice agent 7 8
Relative of financier 7 8
Unknown 7 8
Traitant (fiscal  contractor) 6 7
Other military functionary 6 7
Merchant 4 4
Muniipal officer 4 4
Notary 4 4
Sources : BN, MF 10962-10963 ; BN, NAF 8443-8446 ; and BM, MS 2347.
What is notable here, besides the large number of  commis and préposés, are the 
surprisingly few traitants. These fiscal  contractors, notorious for burdening royal 
subjects with tax schemes, generated a good deal of animosity77. It is reasonable to 
expect that the court would have scrutinized them. But little more than one out of 
fourteen defendants is described as a traitant. Again, it seems the Chamber pursued 
the powerless and insignificant.
It would be an error to assume, however, that the plurality of  commis and 
préposés among the  Chamber’s sentenced defendants means that the court largely 
pursued people of modest means. Commis and préposé were catch-all terms, 
encompassing a range of functions and socioeconomic  conditions. Furthermore, 
some who appear in Chamber documents as  commis might better be understood 
as full-fledged traitants. Antoine Barrangue is a good example. An avocat by 
training and profession, he came under the  Chamber’s scrutiny for allegedly 
helping the infamous  contractor Jacques Le Normand fabricate a royal order for 
offices a Parisian guild was to buy78. Though Barrangue claimed in a court brief 
that he merely collected revenue for the affair in question, he was far from some 
impoverished deputy79. Twenty years before he fell afoul of the Chamber, he had 
purchased an office of secrétaire du Roi, a sure indication of his substantial wealth. 
What is more, Barrangue, when not pursuing his legal career or working with Le 
Normand, was busy on his own account in royal finance. Archival documents show 
he participated in almost forty fiscal  contracts in the final decades of Louis  XIV’s 
reign, making him in effect one of the most active traitants of the period80. So terms 
77 Dessert (1984, pp. 59-65 & 82-107) ; Goldner (2008, pp. 263-350).
78 Dessert (1984, p. 526) ; BN, CL 767, fols. 198-203.
79 BN, CL 767, fols. 199r.
80 Dessert (1984, p. 526).
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like  commis and préposé can be tricky. Those who appear as such in the  Chamber’s 
records may in some cases have been wealthier and more important than these 
generic and subaltern labels suggest.
It would also be wrong to assume, given the total absence of princes of royal 
finance like the receveurs généraux des finances, that the Chamber of Justice 
purposefully overlooked such prominent money handlers. Here it is important 
to keep in mind that the criminal procedure used by the Chamber, and by every 
other jurisdiction adhering to the Ordinance of 1670, was driven by information 
provided by denouncers81. Without  complaints submitted by victims or witnesses, 
the  Chamber’s haul of  convicted wrongdoers would have been meager indeed. 
But that was not the case. People came forward to give evidence, and they did 
so in droves. As we saw above, the number of witnesses in a Chamber criminal 
investigation could be large : over eighty in the Gruet affair, even more in other 
cases82. And before investigations even began, the Chamber relied heavily on royal 
subjects for information. While the precise number of denunciations received by 
the court is unknown, most likely hundreds of them poured into the Chamber. All 
told, those who either denounced or deposed against financiers in the Chamber 
likely numbered in the thousands.
So what we may be seeing here, among those targeted for investigation, are not so 
much the small fry of royal finance as its foot soldiers. Many of the defendants were 
on the front lines of the  crown’s relentless drive for money and resources. And some 
of these foot soldiers, in the desperate last two or three decades of Louis  XIV’s reign, 
had  committed crimes in order to quench the  monarchy’s thirst for money and enrich 
themselves in the process. Thus we see a number of apparently insignificant people 
– lowly huissiers and small-time receveurs des tailles who faced accusations of 
overcharging, threatening, beating, and unjustly imprisoning those who owed money 
to the crown ; and military suppliers like the étapiers whose proximity to the troops 
not only gave them ample opportunity for fraud, but also for starving, poisoning, or 
maiming soldiers due to the shoddy supplies they sometimes provided. To  common 
people who had been brutalized by them, these seemingly unimportant individuals 
were important indeed. They were, as far as ordinary folk were  concerned, the face 
of royal fiscality.
This becomes clearer when we examine the  Chamber’s caseload in two additional 
and interrelated aspects : the most  common areas of activity in which wrongdoing 
was alleged to have occurred, and the most  common accusations leveled against 
defendants83.
81 Andrews (1994, pp. 432 & 427).
82 Over one hundred witnesses, for example, gave testimony in the investigation of Jean  Lempereur’s 
alleged misdeeds in his administration of the Amiens militia. BM, MS 2347, p. 376.
83 As in Table 2, there is some overlap in the categories, as many cases involved more than one area in 
which wrongful activity was alleged to have taken place.
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Table 3. Most  common areas of alleged criminal activity in cases
in the Chamber of Justice, March 1716–March 1717
Wrongdoing alleged to have 
 occurred in
Number of cases (N=42) Percentage of total cases
Supplying regular military 19 45
Paper debt instruments 17 40
Taille collection 12 29
Tax farms 11 26
Obstruction of Chamber inquiries 5 12
Militia (milice), organization and 
supply of
5 12
Traités, exploitation of 5 12
Capitation collection 4 10
Sources : BN, MF 10962–10963 ; BN, NAF 8443–8446 ; and BM, MS 2347.
Here we see more clearly the effects of a quarter-century of war. If we  combine 
the cases where wrongdoing was alleged to have occurred in supplying the regular 
army and navy, together with cases where accusations had been leveled against those 
who organized and supplied the milice or local militia, we find that more than half 
– 57 percent to be exact – of the  Chamber’s caseload involved charges of criminal 
activities in those areas. Almost one-third of cases, furthermore, involved alleged 
wrongdoing in the collection of the taille. If we include purported criminal activity 
in the collection of another direct tax – the capitation – and in the tax farms, we 
see that 65 percent – roughly two-thirds – of Chamber cases involved charges of 
wrongdoing in the hunt for revenue. One final important area of alleged crime 
stands out here : the trafficking and discounting of paper debt instruments – what 
was called agiotage84. In the decades prior to the  Chamber’s opening, the crown 
and its financiers had unleashed a flood of bills and promissory notes. These in turn 
had fueled a black market in discounting, often at rates highly unfavorable to the 
bearer, as desperate royal creditors sought to unload paper that was fast losing value. 
In the Chamber, the high level of purported wrongful activity in paper debt – some 
40 percent of cases involved that allegation – undoubtedly arose from the many 
 complaints from victims of agiotage.
When we examine the most  common crimes with which Chamber defendants 
were accused, a similar picture emerges. As seen in Table 4, defendants in the 
Chamber of Justice tended to be charged with crimes in tax collection, military 
supply, and trafficking in royal debt85. Almost two out of five defendants were 
84 On agiotage, see Höfer (1992, pp. 2-8).
85 Due to the state of the evidence, the findings of Table 4 are approximate. The  Chamber’s arrêst do 
not always indicate the charges that individual defendants faced. I have based this table on explicit 
references to particular crimes in the  Chamber’s rulings, though I have supplemented this when 
certain crimes are clearly implied in the arrêst or related sources. Defendants were often accused of 
more than one crime ; there is thus a degree of overlap in the enumeration of the charges here.
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accused of  concussions or exactions – taking taxes or duties that were not owed86. 
Almost one out of five were accused, respectively, of supplying bad provisions or 
weapons to the military, or gouging bearers of paper debt by deeply discounting bills. 
Rather disturbingly, more than one out of ten were accused of vexations – harassing, 
unjustly imprisoning, or assaulting royal subjects who refused or were unable to pay.
Table 4. Most  common crimes alleged, by number of defendants accused, in cases 
heard by Chamber of Justice, March 1716–March 1717




Taking what was not owed ( concussion/exaction) 34 38
General wrongdoing (malversation) 21 24
Trafficking in paper debt (agiotage) 17 19
Fraud in military supply (mauvaises fournitures) 16 18
Embezzlement (divertissement or
détournement de sa caisse)
11 12
Fraud, usually in financial documents (fausseté) 10 11
Harassment or violence (vexation) 10 11
Sources : BN, MF 10962–10963 ; BN, NAF 8443–8446 ; and BM, MS 2347.
So while its predecessors may have violated judicial norms, replaced ministers 
and their clients, or punished only the weak, this Chamber was different. The 
wrongs that fiscal agents had  committed in prior decades had harmed countless royal 
subjects. This Chamber sought to address those wrongs – but not in a wanton way. 
As the  court’s rate of acquittal suggests, among other evidence given above, the 
Chamber proceeded according to a method that valued evidence and due process. 
If the tribunal had been allowed to  continue, it might have gone some way toward 
rectifying the very real crimes of those who handled the  king’s money. But that was 
not to be.
JUSTICE, MONEY, AND POWER
The interests of the crown, Fréteau remarks in his eyewitness account of the 
Chamber, were “the basis on which all Chambers of Justice are founded and the 
pivot on which they turn”87. In early modern France, all courts were thought – at 
least by royal apologists – to emanate from the  sovereign’s power to judge. They 
were not autonomous tribunals. Instead they were understood by defenders of 
princely authority to be instruments of the crown, operating at the  king’s pleasure. 
But experience showed all too well how these instruments of royal interest could be 
perverted by royal interference. Over the previous century, Chambers had endured 
intense pressure from the kings and ministers who watched over them. During the 
86 For more on the terms  contemporaries used for wrongdoing in royal finance – terms like  concussion, 
malversation, and the like – see Génaux (2002, 2003).
87 BA, MS 2650, p. 15.
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Chamber of Justice of 1607, for example, Sully threatened to throw its judges and 
prosecutor in the Bastille if they deposed witnesses in a particularly sensitive case88. 
And during the Chamber that began in 1661,  Lamoignon’s grandfather was abruptly 
removed as presiding judge for supposedly failing to have the disgraced Fouquet 
prosecuted with sufficient rigor89.
One thing that sets the Chamber of 1716 apart from its predecessors is that it was 
endowed with promises that it would operate independently. Orléans insisted from 
the start that he would allow the Chamber a free hand in its investigations. Indeed, he 
demanded the promise be included in the royal declaration of 17 March 1716, which 
asserts “we will accord no grace, reduction, or moderation of any kind whatsoever 
to persons subject to the inquiry of said Chamber”90. Noailles joined the regent in his 
profession of neutrality, asserting time and again that he played no substantive role 
in the  Chamber’s workings91.
But it quickly became apparent how hollow the promise of noninterference 
was. Noailles, for example, involved himself in Chamber business,  consulting with 
the lead prosecutor Fourqueux, who routinely sought the  minister’s advice before 
he acted92. According to Fréteau, he allowed the  chief judge Lamoignon “some 
shadow of authority”, but only in order to  conceal from him the fact that he was 
being “manipulated”93. The duc  d’Orléans also intervened on a number of occasions, 
notwithstanding his initial pledge to allow the Chamber a free hand. Notably, the 
regent  commuted the death sentence of Paparel, a military treasurer  convicted 
of embezzling over 1.5 million livres. Orléans at first had urged the Chamber to 
prosecute Paparel. But when he learned a royal declaration of 1701 prescribed 
death to officers who diverted funds, he  commuted the sentence to life in prison. A 
deputation of Chamber judges met with the regent to insist that the death sentence 
be carried out, but Orléans rebuffed them94.
The reasons why Orléans and Noailles interfered in particular cases varied, but 
overall they were driven by two motives. First, they intervened to facilitate the flow 
of revenue and the cancellation of royal debts generated by the  Chamber’s sanctions. 
Noailles, for instance, forced the court to accept devalued royal paper instead of 
hard cash from  condemned financiers, in the hopes of both redeeming the  crown’s 
debt and  conserving scarce coin95. Second, they worked to minimize the damage 
the Chamber was causing to the  crown’s fiscal machine. Particularly disturbing to 
Noailles was mounting evidence that the  court’s provincial deputies were detaining 
88 For this and other examples of royal interference in previous Chambers, see Bayard (1988, pp. 329-
330).
89 Guillaume de Lamoignon (1617-1677) was removed in December 1662 and replaced with the reput-
edly more pliable Chancellor Séguier. Bluche (1960, p. 123, 2005, pp. 291-292 & 823).
90 BM, MS 2347, endnote 1, p. 6 ; BN, NAF 8442, p. 33 ; BN, CL 767, fol. 111r.
91 Noailles to the archbishop of Tours, 22 March 1716, BN, MF 6929, fol. 194r ; and the same to Fran-
çoise  d’Aubigné, marquise de Maintenon, 23 March 1716, BN, MF 6929, fol. 194v.
92 Noailles to Fourqueux, 24 October 1716, BN, MF 6938, 16r ; the same to Fourqueux, 8 December 
1716, BN, MF 6939, fols. 5v-6r ; Noailles’ registres des renvois for 1716–1717 in Archives nation-
ales, G7 745-746.
93 BN, NAF 8442, pp. 12 & 20.
94 BN, MF 13684, fol. 124r ; BM, MS 2347, endnote 7, pp. 32-33.
95 BN, CL 767, fols. 224-225 ; BM, MS 2347, p.188 ; Noailles to Fourqueux, 20 May 1716, BN, MF 
6935, fol. 33r.
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tax farmers and their subordinates. In a period when tax farms provided almost 
40 percent of royal revenue, the crown could hardly tolerate disruption there96. It 
occurred nonetheless, becoming so bad in the summer of 1716 that a royal declaration 
demanded that men working in the fermes, who had  committed no wrongdoing, 
should not be troubled in their functions97. Punishing wrongdoers in royal finance 
mattered to the  Chamber’s architects, to be sure. But the court was in their eyes first 
and foremost a fiscal operation, and they meant to keep it that way.
One of the  Regency’s most notable interventions was yet to  come. A royal 
declaration in September 1716 announced that a new  commission would review the 
thousands of personal financial statements already submitted to the court. Based on 
that review, special fines on individual financiers would be issued to methodically 
strip financiers of “a portion of their illicit and excessive gains”. In return for payment, 
individuals would receive a full royal amnesty for any misconduct98. Although this 
declaration insisted the Chamber would  continue “as long as necessary”, its judges 
undoubtedly felt their power slipping away99. They had likely anticipated that 
such fines would occur at some point, since previous incarnations of the court had 
usually ended that way. The most recent one, the Chamber of Justice of 1661-1665, 
had operated for four years before fines were announced100. But in 1716, Noailles 
deployed the maneuver only six months into the  tribunal’s run, and that must have 
startled the judges.
Why Noailles decided to unleash fines on financiers at this point is clear : it was 
fiscally expedient. In a later report, Noailles stressed the efficiency of the maneuver. 
“There was not a moment lost”, he told Orléans at a special session of the Regency 
Council101. The declaration of September 1716 openly admitted that the Chamber 
was taking “a great amount of time” and further “lengthy proceedings” would be 
necessary to correct fiscal wrongdoing. “That sort of delay is unsuitable for the 
present state of our kingdom”, it  concluded102. The Chamber, in other words, was 
taking too long to reap the revenue the crown expected.
Over the next six months, as the court  continued to investigate and punish 
wrongdoing, almost eight thousand personal financial declarations were reviewed, 
and corresponding fines on financiers were issued103. More than 4,400 financiers, 
family members, and associates were assessed, with fines totaling almost 220 
million livres, or about one-third of their declared wealth104. With the appearance 
of the last roll of fines and the suppression of the Chamber in March 1717, Noailles 
and his allies seemed to have triumphed. But in many ways the accomplishment was 
hollow. The meddling of Noailles and Orléans had hindered the  Chamber’s inquiries 
and undermined its authority. But this damage was minor  compared to the disaster 
of the Pommereuil affair – the  regent’s gravest act of meddling.
 96 Marion (1914, p. 64).
 97 BM, MS 2347, p. 212.
 98 BN, CL 767, fols. 257v-58r & 259v.
 99 BN, CL 767, fol. 258.
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In late September 1716, the Chamber arrested Nicolas Odille de Pommereuil, one 
of  Paris’s most prominent police agents. He was suspected of numerous instances of 
“extortion and violence” while in the employ of  d’Argenson, the lieutenant general 
of police. According to the initial request for inquiry, Pommereuil, while  conducting 
surveillance on the traffic in paper debt, had entrapped people into  committing 
illegal speculation and had  committed agiotage himself. He was also suspected 
of stripping suspects of their money and papers and imprisoning them in his own 
house, sometimes for months on end – all the while charging them exorbitant fees 
for their wrongful incarceration105.
Within hours of his arrest, however, Pommereuil was freed.  D’Argenson, having 
heard his agent had been apprehended, had  complained to the regent. The latter had 
promptly signed a lettre de cachet releasing him. The next day, a Chamber deputation 
 convinced Orléans to order the  suspect’s arrest again, but rumors were spreading 
that the agent had already fled Paris. In the Chamber, the judges were reportedly 
outraged by  Pommereuil’s release, and they laid the blame on  d’Argenson. In the 
days that followed, some judges insisted that the lieutenant general of police be 
arrested and interrogated. But a majority decided to send an ultimatum to Orléans : 
if Pommereuil were not immediately rearrested, the Chamber would cease all work. 
Shortly thereafter, news arrived that the regent had ordered  Pommereuil’s arrest. The 
 Chamber’s magistrates were told that they were free to detain anyone involved in 
the affair – with the exception of  d’Argenson himself. The  Chamber’s magistrates 
bristled at this proviso. The inquiry had given them more than enough grounds to 
arrest him, and they had been ready to order it106.
After five days of crisis, the court resumed work. The affair throws into relief 
how, yet again, this tribunal differed from its predecessors. Compared to Louis XIV a 
half-century earlier, Orléans was more  constrained in his exercise of power. Whereas 
the previous Chamber had asserted royal authority, this one saw judges bridling at a 
 ruler’s will. The Pommereuil episode, in the history of the Chambers of Justice, was 
by far the most serious example of judicial resistance.
But as the  controversy passed, the  Chamber’s magistrates  confronted the limits 
of their ability to dispense justice. In late October 1716, the court began proceedings 
against Pommereuil in absentia107. He was later sighted in Lorraine, apparently 
heading to Germany108. According to Fréteau, the affair “made it clear to even the 
most dull-headed that the Chamber had no right to render justice, except on those 
poor wretches whose destruction implicated no one”109. As we saw above, some of 
 Fréteau’s “poor wretches” had in fact  committed serious, sometimes brutal, crimes. 
And some were clients of people as powerful as  Paris’s lieutenant general of police 
– Gruet is a notable example. But when the  Chamber’s inquiries began to threaten 
the flow of revenue, and when it started to bring men like  d’Argenson into its cross-
hairs, it saw “its right to render justice” erode.
105 BM, MS 2347, pp. 320–321 ; Cheype (1975, pp.181-182) ; BN, MF 10962, pp. 351-352 & 357 ; BN, 
CL 767, fol. 263r.
106 BM, MS 2347, pp. 322–323, 335, 340-341 & 343-359 ; BN, CL 767, fols. 265v–266v, 267v ; BN, MF 
10962, pp. 357-358 & 361-368 ; Dangeau (1854-1860, 16, p. 460).
107 BN, MF 10962, pp. 456-457.
108 BN, MF 13779, fol. 163.
109 BA, MS 2650, p. 4.
24 ERIK GOLDNER
THE CHAMBER DISMANTLED
With all the pomp of his predecessor a year earlier, the new chancellor of France, 
Henri François  d’Aguesseau, arrived at the Chamber of Justice to formalize its end. 
A royal edict suppressing the court had just appeared, promising financiers and their 
associates a  complete pardon if they promptly paid their special fines ; all pending 
cases were now forwarded to other courts110. In this last session,  d’Aguesseau excused 
the decision to close the tribunal by saying that, “Even cures sometimes cause illness 
when they last too long”111. He  concluded his address, and the magistrates rose 
to leave. The last Chamber of Justice in the history of the French monarchy was 
dismantled.
For Lamoignon and other Chamber judges, the  chancellor’s address must 
have rung hollow. In the six months after the Pommereuil crisis, the Chamber had 
forged ahead with its prosecutions, at times with notable success112. This was due 
in large part to Lamoignon, who Fréteau claims was the only judge “who did not 
lose courage” after the loss of Pommereuil113. But  Lamoignon’s zeal for prosecuting 
criminal cases likely played a role in the  regent’s decision to close the Chamber. 
 Lamoignon’s criminal prosecutions seemed endless ; some said that bringing a case 
against the prominent financier Bourvalais to its  conclusion would alone  consume 
four years114. By January 1717, Orléans was seeking advice on how to end the 
tribunal. He forwarded a memorandum to the former  controller general of finance, 
Nicolas Desmaretz, accusing the Chamber of “destroying credit and  confidence” 
and “dishonoring and ruining the financiers”. The latter supported the  conclusions, 
writing that the suppression of the Chamber of Justice was “necessary” and could 
not “be done too promptly”115.
Imperfect though the Chamber was, it began, Fréteau insists, “with the best of 
intentions”116. But there was not one but two sets of intentions animating the tribunal. 
There was on one hand the ministerial plan to extract money from financiers ; on the 
other, the magisterial aim to dispense justice to financiers. For Noailles and his allies, 
the tribunal was largely a fiscal maneuver. But for the  Chamber’s judges, it was 
primarily an operation of justice. These two intentions were not mutually exclusive. 
Both judges and officials – and indeed  contemporaries by and large – saw little that 
was cynical in prosecuting individual financiers for wrongdoing and at the same 
time extracting money from them as a group. Fighting corruption and extracting 
money went hand in hand for people in the period. It seemed natural and right117. The 
question was where each group – officials and judges – put their emphasis.
Ultimately, the  Chamber’s cross-purposes bring to light a troubling dilemma in 
the effort to  combat corruption in royal finance in early modern France. The problem 
of the Chamber was not the wantonness of its judges. Instead, it lay in the peculiar 
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nexus of justice, money, and power that both created and destroyed the tribunal. 
The case of the Chamber of Justice of 1716-1717 reveals, first and foremost, that 
the French monarchy had at its disposal by the early eighteenth century a powerful 
mechanism to  confront wrongdoing in its finances. But having something at  one’s 
disposal and actually putting it to full use are different things. In terms of justice, the 
example of the Chamber makes clear that the crown could call on magistrates who 
had thoroughly imbibed a sense of their own importance within the regime, and who 
were more than willing to apply themselves in a dedicated fashion to an appointed 
task118. But the winds of money and power blew too strongly in a countervailing 
direction. From the point of view of officials like Noailles, not to mention Regent 
Philippe  d’Orléans himself, the  crown’s money crisis was simply too dire to prolong 
the disruption that the  Chamber’s investigations were creating. And though Orléans 
had  come to power pledging to refrain from the heavy-handed displays of power 
that critics said had marred the rule of Louis XIV, he still headed a regime that was 
ultimately prepared to maneuver in sudden, seemingly arbitrary ways. Scholars in 
recent decades have done much to revise our understanding of how absolute the 
power of absolute monarchy was in France, showing it to have been in many cases 
more an exercise in  compromise than  confrontation with the  kingdom’s entrenched 
interests119. In the case of malfeasance in its own finances, the monarchy chose to 
do both. That is, it  compromised with financial pressures. And it  confronted the 
magistrates it had appointed to punish those who had defrauded the king and his 
subjects.
So the officials who created the Chamber, and the judges who were  commissioned 
to actually operate it, became estranged. If we believe Fréteau, most of the judges 
were unaware of Noailles’ ultimate plans for the tribunal, and they were shocked 
when he and the regent obstructed it. The majority of the  court’s magistrates, 
according to him, “believed in good faith that [the court] would last as long as 
there were (…) financiers to punish”. They “did not perceive the hidden purpose [le 
mystère] that drove the Chamber”120. That hidden purpose of the  Chamber’s creators 
in the Regency was harvesting money. The need for money, backed by the power 
of the regent and his advisors, ultimately stifled the  Chamber’s ability to judge and 
punish. Immediately after the  Chamber’s last session, its leading magistrates went 
to the Palais Royal to pay their respects to the regent. Fréteau reports that Orléans, 
“ contrary to his usual graciousness”, simply remarked that he was “overjoyed” to 
hear that the Chamber was no more121.
In the following year, Orléans  confronted the looming possibility that the levies 
imposed on financiers in Noailles’ taxe maneuver would do little to alleviate the 
 crown’s crushing debt burden. Despite intense efforts, which included hounding 
assessed financiers and their families for years and in some cases decades, the 
special fines associated with the Chamber ultimately brought in only a fraction of the 
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220 million livres originally assessed122. This in turn arguably encouraged Orléans to 
seek other expedients. In the wake of the  Chamber’s failure to alleviate the  crown’s 
financial woes, the regent entrusted John Law, the Scottish projector, with solving 
the debt crisis. In a notorious episode, Law launched France on a dramatic but short-
lived experiment in state credit. The collapse of  Law’s System in 1720 ensured that 
Frenchmen would, for decades, deeply mistrust forms of money and credit that 
smacked of innovation123.
But the  Chamber’s end was important for more reasons than the turn to  Law’s 
experiment and the hangover from rampant financial speculation that followed. 
Never again in the history of the French monarchy would it target financiers for 
investigation in such a thorough, robust way. There were many reasons for this. 
Most prominent among them were the lingering memory, among the  king’s 
administrators, of the disruption to royal finances that the  Chamber’s inquiries had 
caused,  combined with the increasing integration of financiers into the  kingdom’s 
elites, a social absorption that in the ensuing decades made the crown hesitate all the 
more in bringing them to justice124.
The withering away of robust oversight – in the spectacular, temporary form 
embodied by the Chambers of Justice or otherwise – had its  consequences. Foremost 
among them is that ordinary subjects of the king were deprived of a meaningful way 
to seek justice for fiscal wrongdoing. Scholars have seen the Chambers of Justice 
as façades for cronyism, as mere vehicles for expropriation. There may be some 
justification for that view, particularly in the Chambers that preceded the one that 
began in 1716. But this article has shown that the monarchy did have at its disposal, 
at least on paper, a mechanism to address the crimes  committed by the  crown’s 
fiscal operators. Those crimes, this article has suggested, were not merely against 
the king. Fiscal harassment and indeed outright violence were keenly felt by the 
 king’s subjects – we see that clearly in the evidence collected by the  Chamber’s 
inquiries. And after the  court’s demise, the foot soldiers of royal finance were on the 
march again. Scholars until now have focused on issues of clientage and faction or 
on bottom-line questions of royal revenue and debt. In doing so, they have tended to 
downplay the human trauma inflicted by the  crown’s fiscal machine in this period. 
Looking at the Chamber from the inside out, so to speak, a different aspect appears, 
one in which well-intentioned magistrates sought to rectify very real crimes, only 
to  confront a wall of royal expediency built by the demands of money and power.
Erik Goldner
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